SAA09FY12-006

REV. B

B/L: 389.00 SYS: 175-TON

> BRIDGE CRANE, VAB

AUG 2 0 1993

Critical Item:

Relay, Main Hoist

Find Number:

1SRX

Criticality Category:

SAA No:

09FY12-006

System/Area:

175-Ton Bridge Crane/VAB

NASA Part No:

PMN/

K60-0528/

Name:

175-Ton Bridge Crane/VAS

Mfa/ Part No:

General Electric/ IC28001607F2

Drawing/

67-K-L-11348/

Sheet No:

12

Function: The relay energizes when power is applied to the hoist motor-generator set, closing the normally open (N.O.) contact to allow an increase in current to the DC motor field windings to strengthen the field for normal operations.

The relay is deenergized while in the high speed mode, which opens the contacts, to place resistor RES A in series with the field windings to reduce the current and weaken the field.

Critical Fallure Mode/Failure Mode No:

- Coil Fails Open/09FY12-008.101
- N.O. Contact Fails Open/09FY12-006.102

Fallury Cause:

- Corrosion, fatigue
- b. Corrosion, binding mechanism

Failure Effect: (For both failures) The N.O. contact will be opened placing resistor RES A in series with the DC motor field windings. The field will be weakened by the reduction of current through the windings. The hoist will descend at a higher rate of speed than expected (speed will be approximately double of the commanded input). The worst case scenario would be lowering an External Tank (ET) or the aft end of an orbiter in the coarse speed mode (maximum coarse speed is 10 ff/min), the failure occurring causing the hoist speed to increase to approximately two times the commanded speed, resulting in the ET or the aft end of the orbiter striking the VAB floor or transporter resulting in possible damage to a vehicle system. Time to effect: seconds.

SAA09FY12-006 REV. 6

AUG 2 0 1993

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

Contact Ratings Actual
600 volts 183 volts
25 amps 14 amps

 This relay was off-the-shelf hardware selected by the crane manufacturer for this application.

Test:

- OMRSD file VI requires verification of proper performance of hoist operational test annually.
- OMI Q3008, Operating Instructions, requires all crane systems to be operated briefly in all speeds to verify satisfactory operation before lifting operations.

Inspection:

OMI Q5003, Meintenance Instructions, requires annual inspection of contacts and contact
members for burning, pitting, proper alignment, and discoloration caused by overheating;
visual check of closing coils for deteriorated insulation and evidence of overheating or
burning.

Fallure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

- Correcting Action:
 - The failure can be recognized via the Selsyn (positions change) that is in view of both operators.
 - When the failure indication is noticed, the operator can stop all crane operations by pressing the E-Stop button.
 - Operationally, the crane must be operated in the fine or float speed mode if a critical load is within 10 feet of any structure.
 - Operators are trained and certified to operate these cranes and know and understand what to do if a failure indication is present.
 - 5) During all critical lifts, there is at least one remote Emergency Stop (E-Stop) operator observing the load lift, and can stop the crane if a failure indication is noticed.

SAA09FY12-006 REV. B

AUG 2 0 1993

Timeframe:

- Estimated operator reaction time is 3 to 10 seconds.

Attachment SOSQ234BL Sheet 49 of 132